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Abstract
This paper motivates the study of decision
theory as necessary for aligning smarter-than-
human artificial systems with human interests.
We discuss the shortcomings of two standard
formulations of decision theory, and demon-
strate that they cannot be used to describe
an idealized decision procedure suitable for ap-
proximation by artificial systems. We then ex-
plore the notions of policy selection and logical
counterfactuals, two recent insights into deci-
sion theory that point the way toward promis-
ing paths for future research.
1 Introduction
As artificially intelligent machines grow more capable
and autonomous, the behavior of their decision proce-
dures becomes increasingly important. This is espe-
cially true in systems possessing great general intelli-
gence: superintelligent systems could have a massive
impact on the world (Bostrom 2014), and if a superin-
telligent system made poor decisions (by human stan-
dards) at a critical juncture, the results could be catas-
trophic (Yudkowsky 2008). When constructing systems
capable of attaining superintelligence, it is important
for them to use highly reliable decision procedures.
Verifying that a system works well in test conditions
is not sufficient for high confidence. Consider the ge-
netic algorithm of Bird and Layzell (2002), which, if run
on a simulated representation of a circuit board, would
have evolved an oscillating circuit. Running in reality,
the algorithm instead re-purposed the circuit tracks on
its motherboard as a makeshift radio to amplify oscil-
lating signals from nearby computers. Smarter-than-
human systems acting in reality may encounter situa-
tions beyond both the experience and the imagination
of the programmers. In order to verify that an intel-
ligent system would make good decisions in the real
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world, it is important to have a theoretical understand-
ing of why that algorithm, specifically, is expected to
make good decisions even in unanticipated scenarios.
What does it mean to “make good decisions”? To
formalize the question, it is necessary to precisely define
a process that takes a problem description and identi-
fies the best available decision (with respect to some set
of preferences1). Such a process could not be run, of
course; but it would demonstrate a full understanding
of the problem of decision-making. If someone cannot
formally state what it means to find the best decision
in theory, then they are probably not ready to con-
struct heuristics that attempt to find the best decision
in practice.
At first glance, formalizing an idealized process
which identifies the best decision in theory may seem
trivial: iterate over all available actions, calculate the
utility that would be attained in expectation if that ac-
tion were taken, and select the action which maximizes
expected utility. But what are the available actions?
And what are the counterfactual universes correspond-
ing to what “would happen” if an action “were taken”?
These questions are more difficult than they may seem.
The difficulty is easiest to illustrate in a determinis-
tic setting. Consider a deterministic decision procedure
embedded in a deterministic environment. There is ex-
actly one action that the decision procedure is going
to select. What, then, are the actions it “could have
taken”? Identifying this set may not be easy, especially
if the line between agent and environment is blurry.
(Recall the genetic algorithm repurposing the mother-
board as a radio.) However, action identification is not
the focus of this paper.
This paper focuses on the problem of evaluating
each action given the action set. The deterministic al-
gorithm will only take one of the available actions; how
is the counterfactual environment constructed, in which
a deterministic part of the environment does something
it doesn’t? Answering this question requires a satisfac-
1. For simplicity, assume von Neumann-Morgenstern ra-
tional preferences (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944),
that is, preferences describable by some utility function.
The problems of decision theory arise regardless of how pref-
erences are encoded.
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tory theory of counterfactual reasoning, and that theory
does not yet exist.
Many problems are characterized by their idealized
solutions, and the problem of decision-making is no ex-
ception. To fully describe the problem faced by intelli-
gent agents making decisions, it is necessary to provide
an idealized procedure which takes a description of an
environment and one of the agents within, and identi-
fies the best action available to that agent. Philosophers
have studied candidate procedures for quite some time,
under the name of decision theory. The investigation
of what is now called decision theory stretches back to
Pascal and Bernoulli; more recently decision theory has
been studied by Wald (1939), Lehmann (1950), Jeffrey
(1965), Lewis (1981a), Joyce (1999), Pearl (2000) and
many others.
Various formulations of decision theory correspond
to different ways of formalizing counterfactual reason-
ing. Unfortunately, the standard answers from the liter-
ature do not allow for the description of an idealized de-
cision procedure. Two common formulations and their
shortcomings are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 ar-
gues that these shortcomings imply the need for a better
theory of counterfactual reasoning to fully describe the
problem that artificially intelligent systems face when
selecting actions. Sections 4 and 5 discuss two recent
insights that give some reason for optimism and point
the way toward promising avenues for future research.
Nevertheless, Section 6 briefly discusses the pessimistic
scenario in which it is not possible to fully formalize
the problem of decision-making before the need arises
for robust decision-making heuristics. Section 7 con-
cludes by tying this study of decision theory back to the
more general problem of aligning smarter-than-human
systems with human interests.
2 Counterfactual Reasoning
2.1 Evidential Decision Theory
One simple method of counterfactual reasoning, among
the first suggested in the decision theory literature (Jef-
frey 1983, chap. 5), formalizes the evaluation of what
“would happen” if an agent took action a by taking
a Bayesian probability distribution over outcomes and
evaluating expected utility conditional on a sentence
claiming that the agent takes action a. This requires
specifying a set A of actions that the agent could take,
and the ability to formalize the event “the agent takes
action a” for every action a ∈ A.
This sort of counterfactual reasoning, known as “ev-
idential reasoning,” corresponds to the use of eviden-
tial decision theory (EDT). Unfortunately, formalizing
EDT proves somewhat problematic. Imagine again a
deterministic environment. Given a sufficiently accu-
rate description represented as a Bayesian probability
distribution over propositions about the environment,
the proposition “the agent takes action a” has prob-
ability zero whenever the agent will not, in fact, take
action a. As probability distributions conditioned upon
events of probability zero are undefined, we cannot use
evidential reasoning to identify the best action available
to an agent in this case. This can be remedied in part
by inducing uncertainty about how the agent will act,
but this seems unsatisfactory.
A stochastic environment does not much help. Con-
sider, for example, a scenario in which an agent is al-
most certain to take a suboptimal action, and will only
take the best action if hit by cosmic rays. Conditioned
on the event “the agent takes the optimal action,” the
agent would pay a significant sum to have itself reset (as
it has been compromised by cosmic rays). In this sce-
nario, evidential reasoning might mis-identify the sub-
optimal action as the best available action.
Or, in other words, the problem is not that the dis-
tribution conditioned on “the agent takes action a” is
sometimes undefined, the problem is that the distri-
bution conditioned on this event may contain spurious
correlations (about what could factually cause the agent
to take action a) which are not relevant to the counter-
factual.
This is related to another set of concerns with evi-
dential reasoning. EDT is susceptible to what David
Lewis refers to as “an irrational policy of managing
the news” (Lewis 1981a), a phenomena further explored
by Arntzenius (2008). Eells (1984) has argued that in
most cases, EDT can be prevented from managing the
news in situations where the agent has sufficient self-
knowledge. However, we will demonstrate a scenario in
which the defense of Eells does not apply.
The Evidential Blackmail problem.
There is an artificially intelligent agent that
plays the stock market. It has amassed sub-
stantial wealth. Currently, rumors are cir-
culating about the CEO of one of the com-
panies that the agent has been investing in,
and the agent assigns a 0.4% chance to there
being a scandal that forces the CEO to re-
sign; if that is the case then the agent ex-
pects to lose 150 million dollars.
A clever AI researcher, who is renowned
for honesty, has access to the source code
of the agent. The AI researcher is further
known for the ability to predict how AI sys-
tems will react in simple thought experi-
ments. For simplicity, assume that the AI
researcher is a perfect predictor when given
access to an agent’s source code. The re-
searcher manages to figure out whether or
not there is going to be a scandal (using
information unavailable to the agent), and
decides to use that knowledge as follows:
First, the researcher predicts whether
or not the agent will pay 100 million dol-
lars after receiving the following message.
Then, if either (a) there is not a scandal
and the researcher predicts that the agent
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will pay, or (b) there is a scandal and the
researcher predicts that the agent won’t pay,
then the researcher will send the agent a
pre-drafted message explaining this whole
procedure and that one of either (a) or (b)
turned out to be true (without telling the
agent which one). The message concludes
by asking the agent for 100 million dollars.
Evidential reasoning, given full knowledge of this situa-
tion, prescribes paying up upon receiving the message.
The reasoning runs as follows:
If the agent has received the message, then
it must either be the case that it pays and
there is not a scandal, or it refuses and there
is a scandal. Conditioned on paying, there
is not a scandal, which means the agent only
loses $100 million. However, conditioned on
refusing, there is a scandal, and the agent
loses $150 million. The first option loses
less money, and so is the best action.
This reasoning is flawed: the agent’s choice of whether
or not to pay has no impact upon whether or not the
scandal has occurred. If the agent is the type of agent
which refuses to pay, then the message is evidence of
bad news; but no matter what, paying the researcher
results in a needless loss of $100 million.
However, an agent reasoning according to the pre-
scriptions of EDT would pay the researcher if the mes-
sage was sent. The researcher, knowing this, would send
the message if there was not a scandal, and extract vast
sums of money from the agent in this likely case.
Thus, evidential decision theory is not a process
that always identifies the best available action. Indeed,
this tendency to “manage the news” by prescribing ac-
tions that correlate with (but do not cause) good news,
has led to widespread dissatisfaction with evidential de-
cision theory (Lewis 1981a; Skyrms 1980; Arntzenius
2008). A number of people have attempted to patch
EDT by giving it a chance to reconsider its decisions
partway through the decision process (after learning
what it would have done had it not had the oppor-
tunity to reconsider) (Jeffrey 1983; Eells 1984; Price
1986, 1991), but these attempts have been largely un-
successful to date (Ahmed 2005; Egan 2007; Joyce 2007;
Ahmed 2010). Many decision theorists instead prefer
methods of counterfactual reasoning that prescribe ac-
tions based only upon the causal implications of those
actions.
2.2 Causal Decision Theory
A study of counterfactual reasoning which takes into ac-
count only what the action causes to happen (directly or
indirectly) has led to the development of causal counter-
factual reasoning and the corresponding causal decision
theory (CDT).
S
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Figure 1: The causal graph for the Evidential Blackmail
problem. S denotes whether or not there was a scandal.
R denotes the choice of the AI researcher about whether
or not to send the email. P denotes the choice of the
agent about whether or not to pay the researcher. U
denotes the agent’s utility, measured in dollars.
Pearl’s calculus of interventions on causal graphs
(Pearl 2000) can be used to formalize CDT. This re-
quires that the environment be represented by a causal
graph in which the agent’s action is represented by a
single node. This formalization of CDT prescribes eval-
uating what “would happen” if the agent took the ac-
tion a by identifying the agent’s action node, cutting
the connections between it and its causal ancestors, and
setting the output value of that node to be a. This is
known as a causal intervention. The causal implications
of setting the action node to a may then be evaluated
by propagating this change through the causal graph
in order to determine the amount of utility expected
from the execution of action a. The resulting modified
graph is a “causal counterfactual” constructed from the
environment.
For example, Figure 1 details a possible causal graph
for the Evidential Blackmail problem. CDT, using this
causal graph, would note that the choice whether or not
to pay (P) does not impact whether or not there is a
scandal (S) and identifies refusal as the best available
action.
CDT successfully avoids many of the pitfalls en-
countered by EDT, and is now the modern academic
standard decision theory (Arntzenius 2008; Joyce 2012;
Ahmed 2012). CDT is used under the guise of “po-
tential outcomes” in statistics (Rubin 1974), economics
(Gibbons 1992, chap. 1), and game theory (Tan and
Costa Werlang 1988), and implicitly by many modern
narrow AI systems under the guise of “decision net-
works” (Russell and Norvig 2010, chap. 16).
Unfortunately, causal counterfactual reasoning is
unsatisfactory, for a number of reasons. First and fore-
most, CDT is underspecified: it is not obvious how to
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C D
C (2, 2) (0, 3)
D (3, 0) (1, 1)
Table 1: The Prisoner’s Dilemma.
construct a causal graph in which the agent’s action is
an atomic node. While the environment can be assumed
to have causal structure, a sufficiently accurate descrip-
tion of the problem would not represent the agent’s ac-
tion as an ontologically basic entity, but rather as aris-
ing from a collection of transistors (or neurons, or sub-
atomic particles, etc.). While it seems possible to draw
a boundary around some part of the world model which
demarcates “the agent’s action,” this process may be-
come quite difficult in situations where the line between
“agent” and “environment” begins to blur, such as sce-
narios where the agent distributes itself across multiple
machines.
It does seem possible to disregard the fact that the
agent is composed of parts which follow the laws of
physics in order to treat the agent’s action as an atomic
node. However, while this may be a fine computational
expedient for practical decision making, it is not clear
that this allows causal decision theory to identify the
best action. Consider an environment in which an agent
might overheat, and some actions require more compu-
tation than others. Can CDT take these side-effects
into account, using a model that has thrown away in-
formation about individual transistors? It seems plausi-
ble that graphical world-models could capture decision
problems of this form, but it is not yet obvious how to
do so.
Even given a satisfactory graphical model of the
environment, causal counterfactual reasoning itself is
unsatisfactory. CDT prescribes low-scoring actions on
a broad class of decision problems where high scores
are possible, known as Newcomblike problems (Nozick
1969). The problem can be exemplified in the following
setting:
Consider a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma played by
two identical deterministic agents. Each agent knows
that the other is identical. Agents must choose whether
to cooperate (C) or defect (D) without prior coordina-
tion or communication, with payoffs as in Table 1.2
The actions of the two agents will be identical by as-
sumption, but neither agent’s action causally impacts
the others’: in a causal model of the situation, the ac-
2. This scenario (and other Newcomblike scenarios) are
multi-agent scenarios. Why use decision theory rather than
game theory to evaluate them? The goal is to define a pro-
cedure which reliably identifies the best available action; the
label of “decision theory” is secondary. The desired proce-
dure must identify the best action in all settings, even when
there is no clear demarcation between “agent” and “envi-
ronment.” Game theory informs, but does not define, this
area of research.
A O
U
Figure 2: The causal graph for a one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma. A is the node representing the agent’s action,
O is the node representing the opponent’s action, and
U is the node representing the agent’s utility.
tion nodes are causally separated, as in Figure 2. When
determining the best action available to the left agent,
a causal intervention changes the left action node with-
out affecting the right action node, assuming there is
some (fixed) probability p that the right agent will co-
operate independent of the left agent. No matter what
the value of p is, CDT reasons that the left agent gets
utility 2p if it cooperates and 2p + 1 if it defects, and
therefore prescribes defection (Lewis 1979; Joyce 1999).
Indeed, many decision theorists hold that it is in
fact rational for an agent to defect against a perfect
copy of itself in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, as af-
ter all, no matter what the opponent does, the agent
does better by defecting (Gibbard and Harper 1978;
Lewis 1981a; Joyce 2002). Others object to this view,
claiming that since the agents are identical, both ac-
tions must match, and mutual cooperation is preferred
to mutual defection, so cooperation is the best available
action (Bar-Hillel and Margalit 1972; Altair 2013). The
prescriptions of CDT are not entirely unsatisfactory: if
we have an opportunity to change the code of the agent
after it is copied but before it acts, then CDT correctly
identifies that the agent should be reprogrammed to
defect. But if instead we are writing the decision algo-
rithm of an agent that will be played against a perfect
copy of itself, then it should not follow the prescrip-
tions of CDT. In the moment, CDT identifies defection
as the best available option. But this is incorrect: if
you ever find yourself in a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma
against an opponent guaranteed to act identically, then
you would do better to cooperate.3
CDT assumes it can hold the action of one opponent
constant while freely changing the action of the other,
because the actions are causally separated. However,
3. It is common to object that reality is stochastic and
people seldom encounter identical copies of themselves, and
therefore these situations do not matter. We note both that
(1) the opponent need not be a perfect copy; it seems pru-
dent to cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma against an op-
ponent guaranteed to take the same action as you 90% of
the time and the opposite action 10% of the time; and (2)
the goal is a formally specified means of identifying the best
available decision, and for this it is useful to explore edge
cases.
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the actions of the two agents are logically connected;
it is impossible for one agent to cooperate while the
other defects. Causal counterfactual reasoning neglects
non-causal logical constraints.
Roughly speaking, these non-causal logical con-
straints arise whenever parts of the environment are
logically correlated with (but not causally connected to)
the agent’s action. This can happen readily in any envi-
ronment where other actors possess information about
the agent’s decision-making procedure and are basing
their action on the agent’s expected action.
It is a common misconception that Newcomblike
scenarios only arise when some other actor is a per-
fect predictor (perhaps by being an identical copy).
This is not the case: while Newcomblike scenarios are
most vividly exemplified by situations involving per-
fect predictors, they can also arise when other actors
have only partial ability to predict the agent (Lewis
1981b; Ahmed 2014b, 2014a). For example, consider
a situation in which an artificial agent is interacting
with its programmers, who have intimate knowledge of
the agent’s inner workings. The agent could well find
itself embroiled in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with its pro-
grammers. Let us assume that the agent knows the
programmers will be able to predict whether or not it
will cooperate with 90% accuracy. In this case, even
though the programmers are imperfect predictors, the
agent is in a Newcomblike scenario.
As with EDT, the tendency of CDT to misidentify
suboptimal decisions as the best decision is a flaw that
could be used to exploit agents reasoning according to
the prescriptions of CDT, as in the following scenario:
The Counterfactual Blackmail prob-
lem. There is an artificially intelligent
agent that plays the stock market. It’s quite
competent, and has amassed substantial
wealth. A clever AI researcher, renowned
for honesty and for the ability to predict the
behavior of AI systems in simple thought
experiments, acquires the source code of an
artificial agent. For simplicity, assume that
the researcher is a perfect predictor when in
possession an agent’s source code.
The researcher has developed a com-
puter virus which will affect market opera-
tions and cause a massive crash. If the virus
is used, both the researcher and the agent
will lose $150 million at least. The virus
is designed so that after being deployed it
will remain deactivated for a day, such that
the only way to prevent activation is by the
agent wiring $100 million to the researcher
within 24 hours. If the researcher decides
to deploy the virus, they would then send
a message to the agent demonstrating that
the virus has been deployed and demanding
$100 million.
The researcher is very risk averse, and
will only deploy the virus upon becoming
quite sure that the agent will in fact pay up
to deactivate it.
CDT, evaluating this environment in the situation
where the virus has been deployed, prescribes paying
up as the best action: for once the virus has been de-
ployed, the agent loses $100 million if it pays and $150
million or more if it doesn’t. Thus, an agent reasoning
according to the prescriptions of CDT at the time of
the blackmailing would pay up, and the AI researcher
(seeing that the agent reasons according to CDT) would
deploy the virus, extracting large sums of money from
the agent. This behavior seems unsatisfactory: if the
agent were to refuse to pay, then the blackmailer would
never deploy the virus in the first place; this results in
a better outcome.
As in the case of EDT, a number of people have
attempted to patch CDT by giving the agent an oppor-
tunity to reconsider partway through the decision pro-
cess (after learning what it would have done if it hadn’t
been given the opportunity to reconsider) (Joyce 2007;
Arntzenius 2008; Gustafsson 2011), but the results
have largely been unsatisfactory (Egan 2007; Wedg-
wood 2013).
The goal is to formalize what is meant when asking
that agents take “the best available action.” Causal de-
cision theory often identifies the best action available
to an agent, but it sometimes fails in dangerous ways.
3 Optimization Targets
What is meant by a “good decision”? Section 2 demon-
strated that neither evidential nor causal formulations
of decision theory characterize a satisfactory answer to
this question. A better understanding of the question
is needed before attempting to evaluate whether or not
a given practical heuristic constitutes an answer.
Here an objection arises: why must the program-
mers attain a better understanding of decision theory?
Why can’t this problem be delegated to the system it-
self? Wouldn’t the agent have incentives to improve its
own decision making procedure? Surely, an intelligent
system would be able to identify and address system-
atic failures in its own decision processes. After all, the
question of what procedure to use for making decisions
is itself a decision problem (Skyrms 1982).
Indeed, an intelligent system would generally have
incentives to improve upon its decision-making heuris-
tics (Omohundro 2008), and self-modifying agents act-
ing according to the prescriptions of CDT or EDT
would be able to eliminate much of the suboptimal be-
havior described in Section 2. However, such systems
would not by default converge on satisfactory decision
procedures, for reasons that we will now explain.
To illustrate the problem, it is useful to imagine
hypothetical “CDT agents” choosing according to the
prescriptions of CDT. Such an agent is impractical—
CDT assumes total world-knowledge and fully evalu-
ates the expected utility of all possible actions—but it
serves to demonstrate that practical decision heuristics
approximating causal reasoning would be approximat-
ing unsatisfactory behavior.
Consider an environment containing a self-
modifying CDT agent that is about to be copied,
at which point it will face that copy in a one-shot
Prisoner’s Dilemma. The agent has the opportunity to
self-modify and change its decision procedure. What is
the prescription of CDT? If the agent continues to act
according to CDT after it is copied, it will defect and
achieve payoff 1. But if it self-modifies to unilaterally
cooperate with its copy, then it will cooperate and
achieve payoff 2. Thus, before the agent is copied,
CDT prescribes self-modifying to stop using CDT.
This result generalizes: if an agent is about to
face a situation where CDT performs poorly, then
CDT correctly identifies that the agent should mod-
ify itself to stop using CDT to make decisions. (We
say that CDT is “unstable under reflection,” or “not
self-recommending,” to use the terminology of Skyrms
(1982) and Meacham (2010).) This gives rise to the
question of what decision theory CDT does prescribe
using: given an environment in which an agent may
self-modify to adopt any approach to decision theory,
which does CDT identify as the best available option?
If this selection were satisfactory, then it would not mat-
ter that CDT itself is unsatisfactory, as self-modifying
agents reasoning according to CDT would converge on
good decision-making procedures.
Unfortunately, however, the answer is not satisfac-
tory. In fact, CDT prescribes that an agent resist cer-
tain attempts to improve its decision procedures.
Consider again the scenario where a self-modifying
agent will face a copy of itself in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Assume the scenario works as follows: (1) at
time t = 1 the agent has an opportunity to self-modify;
(2) at time t = 2 the agent is copied; (3) at time t = 3
each agent has the opportunity to self-modify; (4) at
time t = 4 each agent is pitted against the other in
a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Assuming the agent is a CDT
agent at time t = 1, CDT prescribes self-modifying to
cooperate, as this leads to higher expected utility. But
if the agent fails to self-modify at t = 1, then what is the
prescription of CDT at t = 3? In this case CDT pre-
scribes no self-modification, because it considers that
the copies are causally independent, neglecting the log-
ical fact that if one self-modifies then so will the other.
At t = 1, CDT prescribes cooperation, but at t = 3
it prescribes defection. Yet, in all times, CDT is at-
tempting to identify the best available action according
to the same set of preferences.
Expected utility maximization alone is not sufficient
to determine the best available action! It is the combi-
nation of expected utility maximization with a method
for formalizing counterfactuals which defines the best
available action.
We refer to this combination of preferences with
counterfactuals as an optimization target. At t = 1,
the optimization target of CDT is the maximization of
the agent’s utility according to a causal counterfactual
constructed at t = 1. At t = 3, the optimization target
has shifted: the preferences are the same, but now the
maximization is done according to a causal counterfac-
tual constructed at t = 3.
The optimization target of CDT drifts over time:
CDTt=1 reasons that an agent acting according to
CDTt=3 would choose the best action according to the
optimization target of CDTt=3, and this is different
from the optimization target of CDTt=1. CDT pre-
scribes preventing this drift. (Another way of saying
this is that CDT prescribes paying for the opportu-
nity to precommit to certain actions, as explained by
Burgess [2004].)
This answers the question of what decision theory
CDT would prescribe that a self-modifying agent select:
at time t, CDT prescribes that an agent self-modify
to forevermore optimize according to what would have
been the best action according to a causal counterfac-
tual constructed at time t. An agent reasoning accord-
ing to a decision theory of this form would outperform
an agent reasoning according to unmodified CDT: for
example, it would attain high scores in all Newcomblike
problems which began after time t. However, it would
continue to preform poorly in all Newcomblike scenarios
that began before time t.
This may seem acceptable: what does it matter if
the agent scores poorly in Newcomblike scenarios that
started in its past, so long as it can succeed in New-
comblike scenarios that begin in its future? Unfortu-
nately, it may matter quite a bit: any actor with access
to the agent’s original source code would have the abil-
ity to put the agent into a Newcomblike scenario that
began in the agent’s causal past.
To demonstrate, consider the following scenario,
which is identical to the counterfactual blackmail prob-
lem except that the AI researcher now has access to a
copy of the agent’s original source code, and the agent
has the opportunity to self-modify after the researcher
steals the source code but before the researcher decides
whether or not to deploy their virus:
The Retro Blackmail problem. There
is a wealthy intelligent system and an hon-
est AI researcher with access to the agent’s
original source code. The researcher may
deploy a virus that will cause $150 million
each in damages to both the AI system and
the researcher, and which may only be de-
activated if the agent pays the researcher
$100 million. The researcher is risk-averse
and only deploys the virus upon becoming
confident that the agent will pay up.
The agent knows the situation and has
an opportunity to self-modify after the re-
searcher acquires its original source code
but before the researcher decides whether
or not to deploy the virus. (The researcher
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knows this, and has to factor this into their
prediction.)
Clearly, it is preferable for the agent use its oppor-
tunity to self-modify in order to ensure that it would
not give in to the demands of the rogue researcher.
The researcher, then, would be able to deduce from the
agent’s original source that it is the type of agent which
would self-modify in order to precommit to refusing the
rogue’s demands, and would not deploy the virus.
However, according to a causal counterfactual con-
structed any time at or after the agent’s inception,
the behavior of the “copy” that the researcher rea-
sons about (by inspecting the original source code) is
causally disconnected from the behavior of the agent:
CDT and any decision procedure to which CDT would
self-modify see losing money to the blackmailer as the
best available action.
To illustrate what went wrong, let us anthropomor-
phize the reasoning of an agent which started out as a
CDT agent. This agent would never self-modify to ad-
dress the vulnerability, even if given the opportunity to
do so before the researcher accessed its original source.
Its refusal to precommit might be justified as follows:
I am not being retro-blackmailed now,
but I may be in the future. Con-
sider a self-modification designed to prevent
retro-blackmail by precommitting now to
refuse all future retro-blackmailer demands.
Retro-blackmailers decide whether or not to
blackmail according to the predicted behav-
ior of an “instance” of me spawned from
my original source code. My decision to
precommit now does not control the choice
of that instance, as its choices are inde-
pendent of my own. If that instance were
to decide to precommit to refuse all retro-
blackmailer demands, then it doesn’t mat-
ter what I choose now. But if that instance
decided not to precommit, then I had better
not make the precommitment, because I’ll
still be blackmailed and it’s better to give
in once blackmailed. Therefore, I won’t ap-
ply the self-modification.
By contrast, we would like to understand and formalize
the decision theory that corresponds to arguments like
the following:
I am not being retro-blackmailed now,
but I may be in the future. Con-
sider a self-modification designed to pre-
vent retro-blackmail by precommitting now
to refuse all future retro-blackmailer de-
mands. Retro-blackmailers decide whether
or not to deploy their viruses according to
the actions of an “instance” of me spawned
from my original source code, which, being
an instance of me, will also consider self-
modifying to avoid future retro-blackmail
and which will come to the same conclu-
sion as I do right now. If I apply the self-
modification, then so will it, and people
looking at my original source would predict
this, so I would never be retro-blackmailed.
But if I don’t apply the self-modification,
then nor will that instance, and people look-
ing at my original source would predict that
I didn’t, and I’d be retro-blackmailed. The
first option is clearly preferable, so I apply
the self-modification.
However, CDT neither prescribes such a modification
nor the adoption of any decision procedure which would
accept such a modification. Indeed, a CDT agent that
knows it is about to be retro-blackmailed might pay a
significant sum to avoid the patch.4
We have shown that self-modifying systems approx-
imating CDT would not converge on a satisfactory deci-
sion procedure. While intelligent agents have incentives
to improve their ability to hit their current optimiza-
tion target, they would not by default change their orig-
inal optimization targets. When constructing practical
decision-making systems, ensuring that they are decid-
ing according to the right preferences is not enough; one
must also ensure that they make decisions according to
a satisfactory optimization target.
The optimization target of CDT is unsatisfactory.
Evidential decision theory suffers from similar instabil-
ity under self-modification, for similar reasons. Sat-
isfactory optimization targets are not yet well under-
stood.
Lest the reader grow pessimistic from all this discus-
sion of why the problem is difficult, the following two
sections introduce two ideas leading to a new formaliza-
tion of decision theory that has a better optimization
target and avoids many of the shortcomings of both
CDT and EDT.
4 Policy Selection
Consider the reasoning that humans might use to de-
termine that it is better to refuse to pay up on the
(normal, not retro) counterfactual blackmail problem:
Consider an agent that would pay up in re-
sponse to a counterfactual blackmail. The
blackmailer would predict this and black-
mail the agent. Now, instead, consider an
agent that would refuse to pay up in re-
sponse to a counterfactual blackmail. The
4. The specific amount it would be willing to pay depends
upon the probability with which it believes its simulated
copy would avoid the patch. This could consistently be 1,
depending how the causal graph is constructed; in this case
the agent would be willing to pay $49 million to prevent the
patch.
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blackmailer would predict this too, and so
would not blackmail the agent. Therefore, if
we are constructing an agent that might en-
counter counterfactual blackmail, then it is
a better overall policy to construct an agent
that would refuse to pay up when black-
mailed in this way.
Notice that we are choosing between global policies of
“always pay” or “never pay,” without regard for the
agent’s specific observations. Compare this to the an-
thropomorphized reasoning of a CDT agent deciding
whether or not to pay up to a counterfactual blackmail,
upon seeing that the virus has been deployed:
Alas, the virus has been deployed. I would
have preferred that the virus not be de-
ployed, but since it has been, I must now
decide whether or not to pay up. Paying up
is bad, but refusing is worse, so I’ll pay up.
If you ask a person what the agent should do upon
observing the blackmail, they might say “ah, the an-
swer to this question determines whether or not the
agent will be blackmailed; therefore the agent should
not pay.” By contrast, if you hand CDT a description of
the environment in which the virus has been deployed,
it will prescribe paying: because, alas, the virus has al-
ready been deployed. (Notice, however, that CDT also
chooses as we do when deciding what type of agent it
would prefer to place into a counterfactual blackmail
scenario. That is, while CDT prescribes paying, it pre-
scribes constructing agents which refuse.)
This demonstrates two different methods by which
agents can select actions. We, on the one hand, prefer to
construct agents which apply the optimal observation-
to-action mapping.5 A map from observations is known
as a policy, and a decision theory which iterates over
policies (rather than actions) is said to use “policy se-
lection.”
The alternative is to compute the best available ac-
tion given observation. Oftentimes, these two methods
are equivalent; conditioning on observation is usually
the best policy. However, whenever the prescriptions of
these different methods differ, agents using policy selec-
tion outperform agents that condition on observation:
an agent using policy selection can always act as if it’s
conditioning on all of its observations, but an agent con-
ditioning on its observations cannot always act as if it
is using policy selection.
CDT implicitly corresponds to the latter (as does
EDT, for that matter). There is a sense in which CDT
5. Earlier, we mentioned the problem of identifying the
set of actions available to the agent. That problem is be-
yond the scope of this paper; we have been assuming that
the set of available actions is given. Now we must also as-
sume that there is some way of identifying the agent’s obser-
vations, such that the set of observations is also given; an
observation-to-action mapping is then any function which
maps observations to actions.
“prefers” policy selection instead (Burgess 2004); it pre-
scribes that an agent pay for the opportunity to pre-
commit to refusing blackmail if the agent’s source code
is about to be stolen. However, once the observation
of blackmail is made, it prescribes paying: it does not
have agents act as it would have precommitted to act.
Given that it is better for agents to act as they would
have precommitted to act, it is possible to improve upon
CDT by simply specifying a variant of CDT that evalu-
ates actions according to the best available policy. This
can be done by specifying a version of CDT that, in-
stead of iterating over actions available to the agent
and selecting the best one, iterates over observation-to-
action mappings, selects the best, and then applies the
agent’s observations to identify the best action.
For example, in the counterfactual blackmail prob-
lem, an agent reasoning according to policy selection
might reason along the following lines:
The optimal policy is to refuse to pay up
upon observing that the virus has been de-
ployed. I now observe that the virus has
been deployed. Therefore, I refuse to pay.
It may seem strange for the agent to refuse to condition
upon its own observation when selecting its action, but
this is necessary in order for the agent to succeed. In a
sense, the agent is acting as if it can’t tell whether it is
actually observing the virus or whether it is merely the
blackmailer’s prediction, because, after all, the black-
mailer is reasoning about what the agent would do if
the agent did observe the deployment of the virus.
A decision theory that identifies the best policy in
a given scenario (and prescribes acting accordingly)
better captures the notion of “the best available ac-
tion” than a decision theory which considers actions
alone. Variants of decision theory using policy selec-
tion are “updateless” (as agents following the prescrip-
tions of policy selection pick a policy before they up-
date on their observations), and this is the first of two
ideas behind the updateless decision theory (UDT) of
Dai (2009). This idea follows in the wake of Gauthier
(1994), who advocated making decisions using global
policy selection, and Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne
(2004), who applied this idea to an infinite decision
problem similar to the “Procrastination Paradox” of
Yudkowsky (2013). Another decision procedure similar
to that of Dai was proposed by Meacham (2010).
Policy selection is essentially what CDT would pre-
scribe in order to prevent optimization target drift: an
updateless variant of CDT correctly identifies the best
action in the counterfactual blackmail problem. How-
ever, this variant of CDT still has a bad optimization
target: it still prescribes paying up in the retro black-
mail problem. To address that shortcoming, the second
insight of UDT is necessary.
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5 Logical Counterfactuals
Consider the sort of reasoning that a human might use,
faced with a Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the oppo-
nent’s action is guaranteed to match our own:
The opponent will certainly take the same
action as I take. Thus, there is no way for
me to exploit the opponent, and no way for
the opponent to exploit me. Either we both
cooperate and I get $2, or we both defect
and I get utility $1. I prefer the former, so
I cooperate.
Contrast this with the hypothetical reasoning of a rea-
soner who, instead, reasons according to causal coun-
terfactuals:
There is some probability p that the oppo-
nent defects. Consider cooperating. In this
case, I get $2 if the agent cooperates and
$0 otherwise, for a total of $2p. Now con-
sider defecting. In this case I get $3 if the
opponent cooperates and $1 otherwise, for
a total of $2p + 1. Defection is better no
matter what value p takes on, so I defect.
We reason as if our decision controls both agents; the
causal reasoner assumes that their action is independent
from the action of the opponent.
More generally, identifying the best action requires
respecting the fact that identical algorithms produce
identical outputs. However, CDT evaluates actions ac-
cording to a physical counterfactual where the action
is changed but everything causally separated from the
action is held constant.
It is not the physical output of the agent’s hardware
which must be modified to construct a counterfactual,
it is the logical output of the agent’s decision algorithm.
This is the second insight (discovered independently by
Yudkowsky [2010] and by Spohn [2012]) behind Wei
Dai’s UDT.
To give an intuition for what this entails, consider
a motivating example. In the symmetric Prisoner’s
Dilemma, CDT identifies the best action according to a
causal model of the world, as in Figure 2. CDT reasons
that the agent’s action is causally disconnected from
the opponent’s action. CDT considers each action ac-
cording to a counterfactual in which the agent’s action
is changed while the opponent’s action is held constant.
This leads to the consideration of impossible scenarios
where one agent cooperates while the other defects, and
this in turn leads to the conclusion that defection is a
dominant strategy, so CDT misidentifies “defect” as the
best available action.
By contrast, UDT counterfactually considers what
would happen if an agent selected the action a by con-
structing a counterfactual in which that algorithm out-
puts a. Thus, when considering what would happen if
the agent defects, it evaluates a counterfactual world in
which both the agent and the opponent defect.
A()
A O
U
Figure 3: The logical graph for a symmetric Prisoner’s
Dilemma where both the agent’s action A and the op-
ponent’s action O are determined by the algorithm A().
More generally, UDT chooses the best action ac-
cording to a world-model which represents not only
causal relationships in the world, but also the logical
effects of algorithms upon the world. In the symmet-
ric Prisoner’s Dilemma, UDT may reason according to
a world-model that looks something like Figure 3, in
which the output of each agent is determined by the
same algorithm.
By way of illustration, let us anthropomorphize the
reasoning of an agent acting according to the prescrip-
tions of UDT in the real world:
The physical actions of both myself and my
opponent are determined by the same algo-
rithm. Therefore, whatever action this very
decision algorithm selects will be executed
by both of us. If this decision algorithm se-
lects “cooperate” then we’ll both cooperate
and I’ll get a payoff of 2. If instead this de-
cision algorithm selects “defect” then we’ll
both defect and I’ll get a payoff of 1. There-
fore, I (this decision algorithm) select “co-
operate.”
Using reasoning of this form, a selfish agent acting ac-
cording to the prescriptions of UDT cooperates with
an identical agent on a symmetric one-shot Prisoner’s
Dilemma, and achieves the higher payoff.6
In order to identify the best available action, it is
important to respect the logical connections in the en-
vironment, not only the causal connections. When con-
sidering a counterfactual in which an agent selects a
given action, it is important to construct a counterfac-
tual in which all instances of the agent’s decision pro-
cess select that action; otherwise the logical connections
in the environment are destroyed.
6. Note that the agent does not care about the utility of
its opponent. Each agent is maximizing its own individual
utility. Both players understand that the payoff must be
symmetric, and cooperate out of a selfish desire to achieve
the higher symmetric payoff.
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While this idea sounds promising, it has proven dif-
ficult to formalize. Two partial attempts at formalizing
UDT are detailed below, but no fully satisfactory for-
malization of “logical counterfactuals” yet exists.
5.1 First Attempt: Graphical UDT
As alluded to by Figure 3 above, UDT can be formal-
ized using a graphical approach similar to Pearl’s for-
malization of CDT (2000). To do so, the graphical rep-
resentation of the environment must encode not only
causal relations, but also “logical relations.” Unfortu-
nately, it is not yet entirely clear how to encode “logical
relations” in a graph, nor how updates should be prop-
agated through the graph after intervening on one of
the nodes.
Given a probabilistic graphical model of the world
representing both logical and causal connections, and
given that one of the nodes in the graph corresponds to
the agent’s decision algorithm, and given some method
of propagating updates through the graph, UDT can be
specified in a manner very similar to CDT. To identify
the best policy available to an agent, iterate over all
available policies pi ∈ Π, change the value of the agent’s
algorithm node in the graph to pi, propagate the up-
date, record the resulting expected utility, and return
the policy pi leading to the highest expected utility.7 Of
course, the difficult part in this process is the construc-
tion of a graph representing the “appropriate” logical
and causal connections, which is somehow capable of
propagating changes in a satisfactory manner. It is not
at all clear how to construct such a graph given an ar-
bitrarily accurate world model composed of molecules
rather than logical algorithms, for reasons similar to
those discussed in Section 2.2.
In other words, UDT (like CDT) is underspecified,
pending a formal description of how to construct such
a graph. However, constructing a graph suitable for
UDT is significantly more difficult than constructing a
graph suitable for CDT. While both require decreasing
the resolution of the world model until the agent’s ac-
tion (in CDT’s case) or algorithm (in UDT’s case) is
represented by a single node rather than a collection of
parts, the graph for UDT further requires some ability
to identify and separate “algorithms” from the physical
processes that implement them. How is UDT supposed
to recognize that the agent and its opponent implement
the same algorithm? Will this recognition still work if
the opponent’s algorithm is written in a foreign pro-
gramming language, or otherwise obfuscated in some
way? Successfully identifying all copies of an algorithm
in the world is no easy feat.8
7. The best action, then, is pi(o) where o is the agent’s
observation, as per Section 4. In this paper, we leave aside
issues of formalizing what counts as an “observation,” just
as we leave aside the issue of identifying the set of “possible
actions.”
8. Something vaguely similar, however, has been shown
to be possible in certain restricted scenarios (LaVictoire et
A()
X
A O
U
Figure 4: The desired logical graph for the one-shot
Prisoner’s Dilemma where agent A acts according to
A(), and the opponent either mirrors A() or does the
opposite, according to the random variable X .
Even given some reliable means of identifying copies
of an agent’s decision algorithm in the environment, this
may not be enough to specify a satisfactory graph-based
version of UDT. To illustrate, consider UDT identify-
ing the best action available to an agent playing a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma against an opponent that does exactly
the same thing as the agent 80% of the time, and takes
the opposite action otherwise. It seems UDT should
reason according to a graph as in Figure 4, in which
the opponent’s action is modeled as dependent both
upon the agent’s algorithm and upon some source X of
randomness. However, generating logical graphs as in
Figure 4 is a more difficult task than simply detecting
all perfect copies of the an algorithm in an environment.
More generally, a satisfactory formalization of
graphical UDT must account for the logical connection
between the agent’s algorithm and all other algorithms.
Clearly, under the assumption that the agent’s algo-
rithm selects the policy pi, the algorithm “do what the
agent does 80% of the time” is affected. But what about
other algorithms which correlate with the agent’s algo-
rithm, despite not referencing it directly? What about
the decision algorithms of other agents which base their
decisions on an imperfect model of how the agent will
behave? A satisfactory formalization of the “logical im-
plications” of the agent selecting pi must give an account
of how this logical counterfactual affects all other algo-
rithms, and this seems difficult to do in general.
Given all of these difficulties, there is not yet a sat-
isfactory formalization of graph-based UDT. However,
an alternative formalization, known as “proof-based
UDT,” addresses many of these concerns and provides
a more complete (although still ultimately unsatisfac-
tory) formalization.
al. 2014).
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5.2 Second Attempt: Proof-Based UDT
UDT prescribes reasoning about the effects of taking
policy pi by evaluating the logical implications of the
agent’s algorithm selecting the policy pi. As discussed
above, a satisfactory description of the logical impli-
cations of A() = pi requires some method of reason-
ing about how this assumption impacts all other algo-
rithms.
Given some method of reasoning about the effects
of A() = pi on any other algorithm, though, a graphical
formalization of UDT is unnecessary: the environment
itself is an algorithm, which describes how to compute
the agent’s expected utility!
That is, a formal understanding of “logical impli-
cation” could be leveraged to analyze the effects of
A() = pi upon the environment. Thus, to evaluate the
policy pi, UDT need only compute the expected utility
available in the environment as modified by the assump-
tion A() = pi.
This realization leads to the idea of “proof-based
UDT,” which evaluates policies by searching for formal
proofs, using some mathematical theory such as Peano
Arithmetic (PA), of how much utility is attained in the
world-model if A() selects the policy pi. As a bonus,
this generic search for formal proofs obviates the need
to identify the agent in the environment: given an en-
vironment which embeds the agent and a description of
the agent’s algorithm, then no matter how the agent is
embedded in the environment, there will be some formal
proof which identifies it and describes the implications
of that algorithm outputting pi. While that proof must
do the hard work of identifying all copies and variants
of A() and describing how it interacts with the environ-
ment, the high-level UDT algorithm simply searches all
proofs, with no need for formalizing some way of lo-
cating the agent. This allows for an incredibly simple
specification of updateless decision theory, given below.
First, a note on syntax: Square quotes (p · q) denote
sentences encoded as objects that a proof searcher can
search for. This may be done via e.g. a Go¨del encoding.
Overlines within quotes denote “dequotes,” allowing the
reference of meta-level variables. That is, if at some
point in the algorithm pi := 3 and o := 10, then the
string pA() = pi → E() = oq is an abbreviation of
pA() = 3→ E() = 10q. The arrow p→q denotes logical
implication.
The algorithm is defined in terms of a finite set Π
of policies available to the agent and a finite sorted list
O of outcomes that could be achieved (ordered from
best to worst). The proof-based UDT algorithm takes
a description pE()q of the environment and pA()q of
the agent’s algorithm. E() computes an outcome, A()
computes a policy. It is assumed (but not necessary)
that changing the output of A() would change the out-
put of E().
To demonstrate how the algorithm works, consider
UDT evaluating the actions of an agent faced with a
retro-blackmail scenario. For simplicity, assume the
Algorithm 1: Proof-based UDT
Function UDT(pE()q, pA()q):
for outcome o ∈ O do
for policy pi ∈ Π do
if PA proves pA() = pi → E() = oq
then
return pi
return the lexicographically first policy in Π
agent is robbed of its chance to self-modify after the
AI researcher steals its original source; this opportunity
is not necessary in order for UDT to identify the best
solution. The list of outcomes is O := [ 0,−100,−150 ]
according to the cases where (a) the agent is not black-
mailed, (b) the agent is blackmailed and pays up, and
(c) the agent is blackmailed and refuses to pay up, re-
spectively. The set of policies is Π := {Pay,Refuse }
according to whether the agent pays or refuses. To
identify the best action, UDT iterates over outcomes in
order of preference, starting with 0. For each outcome,
it iterates over policies; say it first considers Pay. In the
case that A() = Pay, the agent is blackmailed, and so it
does not achieve the outcome 0, so there is no proof of
pA() = Pay→ E() = 0q. Next, UDT considers Refuse.
In the case that A() = Refuse, the instance of A() in-
stantiated by the blackmailer would also refuse to pay,
and so the agent would never be blackmailed. There-
fore, there is a proof of pA() = Refuse → E() = 0q,
and so UDT selects Refuse.
While this proof-based formalism of UDT is ex-
tremely powerful, it is not without its drawbacks. It re-
quires a halting oracle in order to check whether proofs
of the statement pA() = pi → E() = oq exist; but this
is forgivable, as it is meant to be a definition of what
it means to “choose the best policy,” not a practical al-
gorithm. However, this formalization of UDT can only
identify the best policy if there exists a proof that ex-
ecuting that policy leads to a good outcome. This is
problematic in stochastic environments, and in any set-
ting where PA is not a strong enough theory to find
the appropriate proofs, which may well occur if agents
in the environment are themselves searching for proofs
about what UDT will prescribe (in order to guess the
behavior of agents which act according to UDT).
Even if UDT can find proofs for every policy, there
are environments in which UDT still misidentifies the
best policy. For example, consider a simple two-player
game, described by Slepnev (2011), played by a human
and an agent which is capable of fully simulating the
human and which acts according to the prescriptions
of UDT. The game works as follows: each player must
write down an integer between 0 and 10. If both num-
bers sum to 10 or less, then each player is paid accord-
ing to the number that they wrote down. Otherwise,
they are paid nothing. For example, if one player writes
down 4 and the other 3, then the former gets paid $4
while the latter gets paid $3. But if both players write
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down 6, then neither player gets paid. Say the human
player reasons as follows:
I don’t quite know how UDT works, but I
remember hearing that it’s a very powerful
predictor. So if I decide to write down 9,
then it will predict this, and it will decide
to write 1. Therefore, I can write down 9
without fear.
The human writes down 9, and UDT, predicting this,
prescribes writing down 1.
This result is uncomfortable, in that the agent
with superior predictive power “loses” to the “dumber”
agent. In this scenario, it is almost as if the human’s
lack of ability to predict UDT (while using correct ab-
stract reasoning about the UDT algorithm) gives the
human an “epistemic high ground” or “first mover ad-
vantage.” It seems unsatisfactory that increased predic-
tive power can harm an agent.
There is a larger problem facing this formalism of
UDT, though: even in simple examples, the algorithm
is not guaranteed to work. Consider what happens if
A() = const Refuse: Then there is a proof in PA
that A() 6= Pay, and so A() = Pay implies anything
(by the principle of explosion). As soon as proof-
based UDT proves that an agent will not take a cer-
tain policy, it concludes that taking that policy leads
to the best possible outcome (because from a contra-
diction, anything follows). It identifies the policy that
it proved to be impossible as the best one. If the out-
comes are O := [ 3, 2, 1 ] corresponding in E() to the
policies Π := { High, Med, Low }, and the algorithm is
A() := const Low, then proof-based UDT may misiden-
tify Med as the best available policy.
As discussed by Benson-Tilsen (2014), this prob-
lem is especially interesting in the case where A() =
UDT(pE()q,pA()q),9 e.g. when the UDT algorithm is
identifying the best policy available to the UDT algo-
rithm itself while embedded in some environment E().
In this case, UDT does in fact select the best policy for
which an outcome is provable. This follows from the
consistency of PA. Imagine that UDT identifies a pol-
icy pi which UDT provably does not select. Then UDT
returns pi—but this is a contradiction. Therefore, there
is no policy pi such that PA can prove A() 6= pi, and the
best policy is reliably identified (Benson-Tilsen 2014).
However, this self-referential trickery does not
change the fact that UDT can misidentify Med as the
best policy available to const Low. This problem raises
questions about of what it means to ask what “would
happen” if const Low “chose” High. How complex does
a decision algorithm have to be before calling it an
“agent”? Is a rock with the word “Low” written on
it an agent? What is as an embedding of an agent?
9. While this may seem circular, such a thing is possible
by quining (Hofstadter 1979), e.g. via Roger’s fixed-point
theorem (Rogers 1967).
It is not at all obvious that reasoning about the logi-
cal implications A() = pi is the right way to formalize
counterfactual reasoning.
These problems may well need to be answered in
order to formalize UDT in a stochastic setting, where
it maximizes expected utility instead of searching for
proofs of a certain outcome. Such an algorithm would
evaluate policies conditioned on the logical fact A() =
pi, rather than searching for logical implications. Such
a formalization threatens to bring back many of the
difficulties encountered by EDT in Section 2.1: how
does one deal with the case where A() 6= pi, so that
A() = pi is a zero-probability event? As described in
Section 2.1, the obvious answers are unsatisfactory.
In order to reason about expected utility condi-
tioned on A() = pi, it seems necessary to develop a
better understanding of how to reason about the logi-
cal effects of a contradictory statement. If one deter-
ministic algorithm violates the laws of logic in order to
output something other than what it outputs, then how
does this affect other algorithms? Which laws of logic,
precisely, are violated, and how does this violation af-
fect other logical statements?
It is not clear that these questions are meaningful,
nor even that a satisfactory method of reasoning about
these “logical counterfactuals” exists. It is plausible
that a better understanding of reasoning under logical
uncertainty would shed some light on these issues, but
a satisfactory theory of reasoning under logical uncer-
tainty does not yet exist.10 Regardless, it seems that
some deeper understanding of logical counterfactuals is
necessary in order to give a satisfactory formalization
of updateless decision theory.
6 What If the Problem is Too Hard?
The goal of this study is to formally describe what
constitutes a good decision. While UDT makes some
progress in this direction, and suggests a number of
paths for future research, there is still some concern
that the task is too difficult: What if no satisfactory
formalization of logical counterfactuals exists? What
if it becomes possible to implement practical smarter-
than-human systems before decision theory is fully un-
derstood?
As discussed in Section 3, decision procedures
are not necessarily stable under reflection, and self-
modifying agents approximating an unsatisfactory vari-
ant of decision theory do not necessarily converge on
good decision-making behavior. If a satisfactory for-
malization of decision theory cannot be found, some
alternative approach must be used to ensure desirable
behavior. It seems possible to use some sort of “in-
directly normative” approach (as per Bostrom [2014,
10. A logically uncertain reasoner can know both the laws
of logic and the source code of a program without know-
ing what the program outputs. For a discussion of active
research on this topic, see Soares and Fallenstein (2015).
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chap. 13]) in which the intelligent agent itself is made
to do the abstract work of discovering a satisfactory de-
cision theory, by figuring out what humans would have
wanted if given more time (rather than by using its own
judgement).
Though an indirect approach would not require a
full formalization of decision theory, it may well still re-
quire an improved understanding: if one wants to del-
egate the task of deciding which decision theory they
would have wanted, they must at least trust the system
enough to make that decision, first. It is not clear that
a modern understanding of decision theory is enough
for even this.
Even if one decided that causal counterfactual rea-
soning is good enough, they still face the problem that
CDT is not fully specified. How is the agent’s action
node identified in the environment? How can CDT be
made to handle the fact that the agent’s action node is
not atomic, but made of transistors which may break or
overheat? How can the set of available policies be iden-
tified? What counts as an “observation” with respect
to policy selection? If the goal were to implement a
practical agent approximating CDT and then use some
indirect method to have it find a better decision theory
to approximate, then the focus of research may shift,
but a further study of decision theory would still be
required.
7 Conclusion
The goal of answering all these questions is not to iden-
tify practical algorithms, directly. Rather, the goal is
to ensure that the problem of decision-making is well
understood: without a formal description of what is
meant by “good decision,” it is very difficult to justify
high confidence in a practical heuristic that is intended
to make good decisions.
A well-posed question often frames its answer: a for-
mal description of how to identify the “best available
policy” with respect to some set of preferences in an
arbitrary environment would fully characterize an ideal
decision-making procedure. Idealizations are imprac-
tical, but before attempting to design a heuristic that
solves a problem, it is useful to understand the solution
which the heuristic is intended to approximate. (For
further discussion, see Soares and Fallenstein [2014].)
Developing an idealized understanding of decision
theory may seem an insurmountable task, but the in-
sights discussed in this paper, regarding policy selection
and logical counterfactuals, give some reason for opti-
mism. Updateless decision theory provides a new take
on decision theory that addresses shortcomings of both
evidential and causal reasoning. While it does not fully
solve the problem of decision-making, it does point to-
wards some promising directions.
A number of open problems remain, and many of
them are concrete and approachable. We are optimistic
that further decision theory research could lead to sig-
nificant progress toward understanding the problem of
decision-making. We remain hopeful that a sufficient
understanding of the problem can be attained before
the need for practical solutions arises.
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